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Abstract
Tax authorities around the world often are reluctant to disclose audit policy de-
tails. In particular, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has the practice of releasing
broad statistics like the audit rate of each income class but resists pressures demand-
ing details on how diﬀerent circumstances might result in a higher audit probability
to taxpayers. This paper experimentally examines whether disclosing such details can
reduce tax compliance. We compare a Flat-rate treatment, where taxpayers are told
about the average audit probability, with a Bounded treatment, where taxpayers are
fully informed of the contingent audit probability structure. Our ﬁndings do not sup-
port the potential concern against disclosing details. In an additional Bounded-hi-q
treatment where multiple equilibria exist, the compliance level is even higher under
full disclosure of the probability structure.
JEL codes: H26, M42, C9, C72
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1 Introduction
This paper asks whether more transparency in government agencies compromises their com-
missioned objectives. Speciﬁcally, we study the impact of information disclosure, concerning
audit policy details, by a tax authority like the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on the
level of tax compliance. IRS has long been accused of having a “secret culture” (see Saxon
(1994), Johnston (1995b), and Davis (1997)).1 While the agency is not as opaque as before,
what people know about IRS audits is still mainly from broad statistics provided on its web
site (e.g., from the IRS Data Books).2 Even though, following the enactment of the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, the agency has made public the Internal Revenue
Manual (IRM) describing the tax audit process (Gates (2000)), certain details of the audit
policy remain undisclosed to taxpayers.3
Why does IRS disclose only broad statistics like the audit rate of each income class but
not details of the audit policy? Apparently, the agency worries that the tax compliance
level would fall should taxpayers know details of the audit policy (New York Times (1981a)
and New York Times (1981b)). In this paper, we investigate whether a tax authority could
1For example, “the [US] Government’s chief keeper of historic records said [on 20 December 1995] that
the Internal Revenue Service has, for at least two decades, violated Federal laws that require it to identify
signiﬁcant documents and turn them over to the National Archives. ... John W. Carlin, the Archivist of the
United States, gave the I.R.S. 90 days to come up with a plan to identify, safeguard and eventually turn over
to his oﬃce records that may have historic value. His 50-page evaluation cited "serious shortcomings" in
I.R.S. record-keeping and questioned whether some important records had been lost or destroyed. "Numerous
records that document both policy-making and high-proﬁle programs" either are not scheduled to be released
to the National Archives "or have not been located and identiﬁed," the evaluation said. ... Critics have long
accused the I.R.S. of excessive secrecy, and historians, individual taxpayers and others have battled for access
to statistical data.” (Johnston (1995b))
2Documentation of IRS audit practices in the academic literature is sparse. An example is Pentland and
Carlile (1996).
3Evidence for this is not hard to ﬁnd. For example, the actual operation of the discriminant function
(DIF) formula used to identify the most suspicious tax returns for follow-up remains a “closely guarded
secret” (Jones (2001)). It seems that IRS has released the entire IRM on its web site. But a careful
look at the web manual shows that the section IRM 4.19.1.2.6, Form 1040 Individual Returns Scored
by DIF System (Audit Code Deﬁnitions) is missing (see the Table of Contents of Part 4 of the IRM at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/index.html). According to IRM 4.1.3.2.2, the missing section contains Audit
Codes used to identify returns “delivered [directly] to Examination as Automatics for manual screening,”
regardless of the DIF scores. Apparently, IRS wants to keep the information secret.
Thoroughly searching over the web IRM can locate partial information about the Codes, e.g., in Exhibit
3.11.3-5. However, like multiple places of the section IRM 3.11.3 Individual Income Tax Returns (e.g., Exhibit
3.11.3-8 Examples of Reasonable Causes and Exhibit 3.11.3-6 Unallowable Codes), some details have been
overwritten with equal signs (=). Similar blacked-out’s can be found in other IRS documents released to the
public, e.g., pages 3-4, 3-8, 3-14, and 3-15 of the 2010 version of “IRS Processing Codes and Information”
(IRS (2010)).
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be no worse oﬀ by fully disclosing to taxpayers the structure of an audit policy, instead of
merely telling them the average audit probability. Answering this question is important. It
can provide evidence to support the information-withholding position of IRS, or otherwise
give some assurance to the agency to become more transparent, as critics have demanded,
without compromising the objective to increase tax compliance.
The tension between increasing government transparency and keeping appropriate levels
of secrecy is not new (Ginsberg (2011)). Watchdog organizations like OMB Watch, Citizens
for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, First Amendment Coalition, and Taxpayers for
Common Sense always press for more transparency and freedom of information. However, the
demand for government transparency has never been stronger (Ornstein and Limor (2011)).
Since Barack Obama was elected as the US President, the administration has emphasized
the commitment to “creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government” (Obama
(2009)). As a result of the Open Government Initiative, agencies are asked to increase
disclosures (see, e.g., Department of the Treasury (2011)). Still, censorship of information
prior to release is not unheard of (The Associated Press (2011)).
As for IRS, the reluctance to disclose information has not changed much in the last four
decades.4 The reservation is not only on open disclosure to the public but also on conﬁdential
4In 1973, Ralph Nader of Tax Reform Research Group invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
in order to obtain some IRS documents. The agency refused and Nader responded with a suit before IRS
reluctantly agreed to provide the documents (Time (1974)). A year before this, Susan Long and her husband
started the litigation lasting for over 15 years, involving courts as high as the US Supreme Court, forcing the
agency to be more open in releasing information. “Their ﬁrst successful legal action set the principle that
the I.R.S. could not withhold information like statistics on the audit rates for taxpayers in diﬀerent income
groups, nor its basic operating manual.” (Saxon (1994)).
It was thought that the nearly two decades of litigation ﬁnally came to an end when IRS was ordered to
pay the Longs’ legal fees in 1991. But the battle reopened in 2004 when IRS told Susan Long that after
extensive research, its lawyers concluded that “no court order existed and ‘accordingly, the I.R.S. is not in
violation of any standing injunctions’” by withholding information from her (Johnston (2006)). In 2006,
Long went to court again to ﬁle a legal motion to require the agency to comply with prior court orders to
turn over detailed data on its audit practices (Johnston (2006)). On 13 June 2008, the US District Court in
Seattle granted her motion. IRS timely appealed the order. Finally, on 16 September 2010, the US Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aﬃrmed in part and reversed in part the 13 June 2008 order, ruling that
some information taken from IRS’s Form 5344 of one particular taxpayer, referred to as “cells of one,” is
conﬁdential under 26 U.S. Code Section 6103(b) (United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(2010)).
Long was not the only one in battle with IRS for information disclosure in recent years. For example,
Tax Analysts, the nonproﬁt publisher of Tax Notes magazine, went to court for obtaining e-mail messages
in which tax auditors in the ﬁeld were given advice on how to apply the law. “We won a unanimous court
of appeals decision that they can’t hide this stuﬀ,” Tax Analysts’ president said, “but instead of complying
with the order to produce it, they are playing games.” (Johnston (2008)).
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disclosure to researchers (see, e.g., Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), page 375). Intrigued by
the puzzling attitude of IRS, we are interested in verifying whether disclosing audit policy
details necessarily reduce tax compliance, or maybe it could actually increase compliance.
Laboratory tightly controls many factors that may aﬀect behaviors. It also allows mea-
suring certain personal characteristics, e.g., risk aversion level, that might be important to
explaining behaviors but hard to measure outside laboratory. For these and other reasons,
randomized experiments in laboratory are not subject to various limitations of observa-
tional experiments (Rosenbaum (2002)). Randomized experiment therefore oﬀers an excel-
lent methodology for us to answer the research question without worrying about confounding
eﬀects that might arise from using archival data.
Consistent with IRS’s practice of disclosing only broad statistics like the audit rate of
each income class, prior experimental studies on tax compliance usually consider settings
where subjects are told to be audited independently at a known, constant probability (e.g.,
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1974), Moser et al. (1995), Zimbelman and Waller
(1999), Boylan and Sprinkle (2001), Kim et al. (2005), Kim and Waller (2005), Alm et al.
(2009), and Kleven et al. (2011)). A recent theoretical study shows that such a ﬂat-rate
audit rule in equilibrium has the same deterrence eﬀect as a variable-rate rule, referred to
as the bounded rule (Yim (2009)).
Simply put, the bounded rule fully utilizes a given audit capacity to randomly select
a sample of equally suspicious reports to check if the number of such reports exceeds the
capacity, or otherwise audits all of such reports. Because the number of reports selected
for audit is bounded by the audit capacity, the audit probability facing a taxpayer varies
depending on the total number of suspicious reports ﬁled by the taxpayer population. By
setting the audit capacity appropriately, the compliance level induced by the bounded rule
can be equivalent to that by the ﬂat-rate rule. This theoretical equivalence together with
the simple binary-income setting from which the bounded rule was derived makes comparing
the two rules experimentally using human subjects a suitable way to answer our research
question.
In designing our experiment, we bear in mind the “Why People Pay Tax” (WPPT) puzzle
documented in the tax compliance literature (Alm et al. (1992)). It is unclear why most
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people ﬁle tax returns honestly when the average audit probability is only 1% (Slemrod
(2007)). Given this phenomenon, it is important to ensure that our experiment provides
a suﬃcient incentive to lie. Otherwise, if nearly all participants behave honestly in our
experiment, the result would bias toward a “no diﬀerence” conclusion. To avoid this bias,
the baseline Flat-rate treatment of our experiment provides a strong enough incentive for
participants to lie. It is so strong that theoretically all participants should lie, just like the
key feature of the documented puzzle. However, also like the puzzle, the actual outcome is
a compliance level much higher than 0%.
To compare with the Flat-Rate treatment that represents the practice of disclosing only
the average audit probability, our Bounded treatment lets participants know how the audit
probability is contingent on the total number of suspicious reports ﬁled by taxpayers. Like
the Flat-rate treatment, the Bounded treatment has a predicted compliance level of 0%. The
actual outcome, again, is far above the theoretical prediction.
We ﬁnd that compared to the Flat-rate treatment, the compliance level is not lower
under full disclosure of the contingent audit probability structure in the Bounded treatment.
Interestingly, it is actually higher in estimated magnitude (43%, rather than 39% in the
Flat-Rate treatment), though not statistically signiﬁcant. Similar results continue to hold
when conﬁning to the last 10 periods where participants should have become familiar with
the environment (47%, rather than nearly 42% in Flat-Rate). The ﬁndings support our
hypothesis that there is no diﬀerence in the compliance levels under the bounded and ﬂat-rate
rules, which represent disclosing audit policy details (i.e., the contingent audit probability
structure) versus merely the average audit probability. We conclude that disclosing audit
policy details does not necessarily reduce tax compliance.
To see whether the conclusion might be sensitive to a parameter in the experiment, we
contrast the Bounded treatment with the Bounded-hi-q treatment. This additional treatment
captures the case where taxpayers in an area under the jurisdiction of an IRS District Oﬃce
are more likely to have a high income.5. When the parameter q is high, there are multiple
equilibria under the bounded rule in the tax compliance game of the experiment. One of the
5Consistent with the emphasis by Yim (2009), tax audits are administrated by IRS District Oﬃces under
audit capacity constraints. See further discussion in section 5.
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equilibria involves all high-income taxpayers tacitly coordinating to lie. Another involves all
of them reporting honestly. The third is a mixed equilibrium where each taxpayer randomizes
to lie with the same probability.
We ﬁnd that the conclusion from the ﬁrst two treatments is not sensitive to the existence
of multiple equilibria in the Bounded-hi-q treatment with a high q. We observe a higher
level of compliance in this treatment (66% overall and 74% for the last 10 periods) than in
both the Flat-rate and the Bounded treatment. We further conclude that fully disclosing the
audit probability structure, rather than merely the average audit probability, can increase
tax compliance, instead of reducing it.
Besides the main ﬁndings above, we also analyze the audit budget implications of the
bounded rule to see whether they are broadly consistent with the theoretical insights of Yim
(2009) where the rule was derived. The results suggest that the bounded rule on average
conducts fewer audits than the ﬂat-rate rule. If taking into account the budget commitment
required to credibly implement the ﬂat-rate rule, the bounded rule has a higher budget usage
ratio than the ﬂat-rate rule. Both results are in line with the theoretical insights about the
bounded rule, suggesting no unexplained issue that might cause any concern.
Though consistent with the documented WPPT puzzle, the compliance levels observed in
the experiment are under-predicted quite substantially by the standard theory. This leads us
to conduct additional analyses to reconcile the discrepancy using alternative choice models
under uncertainty. The observed behaviors can be satisfactorily explained by a loss aversion
model. We are not aware of any unusual results from the analyses that might compromise
the conclusion of our main analysis.
This paper adds to the literature on understanding how dissemination of enforcement
information might aﬀect taxpayers’ behavior (e.g., Slemrod et al. (2001)). Focusing on the
compliance impact of information dissemination regarding audit results, Alm et al. (2009)
ﬁnd that the eﬀect of post-audit information is conditional on whether the taxpayer is well
informed of the audit probability prior to ﬁling. Unlike them, we do not consider disclosing
population-wide audit results of the previous period before the ﬁling in a period. Instead, to
be in line with the setting of Yim (2009), we use each period to capture a new observation of
a one-shot game, rather than a snapshot of a multiple-period dynamic game. Our focus is on
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the disclosure of the underlying contingent audit probability structure (Bounded), which has
a deterrence eﬀect theoretically equivalent to that of the average audit probability disclosed
(Flat-rate). Alm et al. (2009) consider only the latter case to contrast with the alternative
of no disclosure at all.
Research in the disclosure literature has predominantly concentrated on corporate trans-
parency (e.g., Bushman et al. (2004) and Francis et al. (2009)). One of the main themes
is that companies with more disclosure might enjoy the beneﬁts from reducing information
asymmetry, namely a lower cost of capital, a smaller bid-ask spread, etc (e.g., Botosan and
Plumlee (2002)). This paper extends the literature to consider government transparency.
What motivates government agencies’ lack of transparency appears to be the potential ben-
eﬁts from being opaque. Our ﬁndings, however, suggest that a presumed beneﬁt might not
exist. Interestingly, there might even be some overlooked cost (in terms of foregone beneﬁt)
under certain circumstances (e.g., a high q).
Findings from accounting research suggest that investors do not fully exploit publicly
available information, nor fully understand the implications of the information, in mak-
ing investment decisions (e.g., Bartov et al. (2000), Dechow et al. (2008), and Landsman
et al. (2011)). Possible reasons include limited attention or other information processing or
transaction costs (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Louis and Sun (2010), and Corwin and
Coughenour (2008); see also the discussion by Schipper (2007)). Consistent with such ﬁnd-
ings, our results suggest that maybe IRS has overly worried about the impact of disclosing
audit policy details.
To meet people’s increasing demand for transparency in government, IRS can set out a
plan to disclose more information about the audit policy on an annual basis. Each year
the incremental disclosure should be about a clearly deﬁned set of new information and be
released on a speciﬁc date before the deadline of another round of tax return ﬁling. This
way researchers can precisely analyze the impact of the incremental information disclosure.
Further evidence can thus be provided to determine whether even more disclosure or IRS’s
current position of information withholding should be supported. Ultimately, such research
may help IRS to understand how its commissioned objectives can be best fulﬁlled. The
unintended monitoring functions of IRS on the ﬁnancial market and ﬁnancial reporting
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quality (see Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), page 138, El Ghoul et al. (2011), and Hanlon
et al. (2011)) might also be enhanced.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We describe the experiment design and
procedure in the next section, ending with our hypothesis for testing. Main results from
the experiment are discussed in section 3. In section 4, we conduct additional analyses to
reconcile the discrepancy between the compliance level actually observed in the experiment
and that predicted by the standard theory. Section 5 reviews related tax compliance studies
and further explains why we design the experiment based on the bounded rule. Section 6
contains concluding remarks. The theoretical analysis upon which our experimental study
is based, technical details and proofs, and the experiment instructions are provided in the
appendix (Tan and Yim (2011)).
2 Experiment and Hypothesis
2.1 Design
The tax compliance game in all treatments of our experiment has three stages: (i) income
reporting and tax deduction, (ii) audit and ﬁne deduction, and (iii) feedback. Subjects receive
either a high income IH = €25 (H-type) or a low income IL = €10 (L-type) with probability
q or 1 − q, respectively. Subjects are informed of the group size N and the probability q.
Based on the capacity constraint in the lab, the size of the taxpayer population is ﬁxed to
be N = 8. The parameter q is either 0.5 or 0.9 depending on the treatment.
During the income reporting stage, subjects have to decide simultaneously and indepen-
dently the report type (“high income” or “low income”) to submit to an auditor, which
is simulated by a computer. The computer automatically deducts taxes according to the
reported income. The tax for subjects reporting a “high income” is TH = €12.5, whereas
the tax for subjects reporting a “low income” is TL = €2.5.6 Subjects are told that taxes
6Experimental parameters concerning taxation are chosen to be in line with the reality. For instance,
the real-world tax rates for high-income and low-income taxpayers are usually dependent on the levels of
their incomes. In particular, many countries such as Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and the USA
use a progressive tax system instead of a proportional one. Hence, this experiment adopts a progressive tax
system for the sake of facilitating subjects’ understanding.
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are deducted based on their reported income instead of true income. For instance, if H-
type players submit a “low-income” report, they receive €22.5, instead of €12.5. Similarly,
L-type players receive −€2.5, instead of €7.5, if they submit a “high-income” report.7 In
the audit stage, the computer implements either a ﬂat-rate rule or a bounded rule to audit
“low-income” reports submitted. In the experiment, “high-income” reports are not audited.
This is consistent with the IRM guidelines (see section 5 for further details).
Described below are the designs of the three treatments of the experiment. Key parameters
of the treatments are summarized in Table 1.
Flat-rate: In this treatment, subjects are told that those ﬁling “low-income” reports
independently face an audit probability of a = 0.4. This audit probability induces the same
compliance rate as the bounded rule does with an audit capacity K = 2.8 If subjects report
honestly, nothing will happen to their ﬁnal payoﬀs. If cheaters are caught by the auditor,
they need to pay back the €10 of taxes evaded plus a ﬁne of F = €10.
Bounded: In this treatment, the ﬁne for cheaters is exactly the same as in the Flat-rate
treatment. The audit probability, however, depends on the total number of “low-income”
reports received. The maximum number of audits to be conducted is K = 2. This value of
the parameter guarantees a unique Nash equilibrium based on non-cooperative game theory
(see the theoretical analysis provided in the appendix for details). Setting K = 2 means
that if the number of “low-income” reports does not exceed two, then all of them will be
audited with probability 1. Otherwise, the audit probability decreases monotonically with
the number of “low-income” reports, denoted by L. In particular, the probability is 0.67
for L = 3; 0.5 for L = 4; 0.4 for L = 5; 0.33 for L = 6; 0.29 for L = 7; 0.25 for L = 8.
Instead of merely disclosing the average audit probability, the contingent audit probability
structure is fully disclosed to subjects through an audit probability table (see the experiment
instructions provided in the appendix for details).
Bounded-hi-q: Except for the ex-ante probability q of receiving a high income, this
7Even when a subject with a low income makes a loss by submitting a “high-income” report and that
decision is selected for payment, the potential loss is covered by a show-up fee of €3. During the experiment
sessions, this situation never actually happens.
8Because the ﬂat-rate rule induces all-or-none behavior in compliance, such a rule with an audit proba-
bility a < 0.5 theoretically has the same deterrence eﬀect as the bounded rule, assuming the standard setup
with perfectly rational, risk-neutral players.
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treatment is the same as the Bounded treatment. The high q = 0.9 of this treatment
represents the case of an area under the jurisdiction of an IRS District Oﬃce where taxpayers
are more likely to have a high income. Compared to the Bounded treatment, subjects lying
in this treatment face a higher degree of uncertainty because fewer “low-income” reports will
be submitted given the low probability of having low-income taxpayers. Consequently, there
will be fewer honest “low-income” reports to pool with lying “low-income” reports, making
lying easier to be detected by audits. The theoretical analysis provided in the appendix
shows that the game in this treatment has multiple equilibria. We are interested in knowing
whether the behavior observed in the Bounded treatment is sensitive to the presence of
multiple equilibria under the bounded rule when q is high.
2.2 Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of a European university from October to
December 2009. Most of the university students participating as subjects in the experiment
were major in economics or business. The experiment instructions, provided in Appendix
C.2, were modiﬁed from those in prior tax compliance studies, namely Alm et al. (2009), Kim
et al. (2005), and Kim and Waller (2005). We used Z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007)) to
program and conduct the experiment.
Each treatment of the experiment consists of four sessions; each session has 16 subjects.
The duration of a session is about 1 hour (including the initial instruction and ﬁnal payment
to subjects). The average earnings are €16.23 (including the €3 show-up fee). At the begin-
ning of each session, subjects are randomly assigned to the computer terminals. Before the
experiment starts, subjects have to complete an exercise making sure that they understand
the rules of the tax compliance game.
The game consists of 30 periods. At the beginning of each period, 16 subjects are randomly
allocated into two groups of eight. The random re-matching protocol minimizes the chances
that subjects encounter the same group of participants again. The purpose is to simulate a
one-shot scenario but allows the subjects to be familiar with the game environment. This is
particularly important for treatment sessions with the bounded rule. Each period can thus
constitute a new observation of a one-shot game, rather than a snapshot of a multiple-period
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dynamic game. At the end of each period, a summary screen is presented to subjects with
feedback information including the subject’s true and reported income, and the ﬁnal payoﬀ
for the period. Subjects are not informed of others’ payoﬀs.
Upon ﬁnishing the tax compliance game part of the experiment, subjects are asked to
complete a risk elicitation task similar to the one used by Holt and Laury (2002). The
instructions for the risk elicitation task are handed out only after the tax compliance game.
Hence, the subjects are not aware of its existence beforehand. Details of this task can be
found in the experiment instructions. The task measures subjects’ risk aversion levels, which
could be useful in explaining their behaviors.
During the payment stage, one period of the tax compliance game and the realization of
one lottery of the risk elicitation task are randomly selected to determine the ﬁnal payment
to a subject. This random payment scheme mitigates the potential income eﬀect that the
subjects carry across diﬀerent periods of the game and over to the risk elicitation task.
We conclude this section by stating the hypothesis for testing, which is based on the
prediction (Proposition 2) derived in the theoretical analysis given in the appendix.
Hypothesis 1 The underreporting rates in the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments are the
same.
Because the game in the Bounded-hi-q treatment has multiple equilibria, we merely com-
pare the underreporting rate in the treatment with those in the other two without advancing
any hypotheses based on theoretical predictions.
3 Main Results
Figure 1 depicts the average underreporting rates across treatments. The dynamics in the
Flat-rate and Bounded treatments look similar. In contrast, the average underreporting rate
in the Bounded-hi-q is visibly lower and declines steadily over periods.
Table 2 summarizes the compliance behaviors and auditing statistics across experimental
treatments. The ﬁrst three columns contain averages over all 30 periods of play. The next
three columns are averages of the last 10 periods, where subjects’ behaviors are expected
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to be more stable after becoming familiar with the environment. Statistical testing on the
treatment eﬀects is based on the two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test (also called the Mann-
Whitney test). We adopt the strictest standard to use each session as an independent
observation. This avoids any doubt that observations at more reﬁned levels (e.g., by subject
or by session-period) might not be completely independent. Such doubt arises from the fact
that unlike individual decision-making experiments, subjects in our treatments under the
bounded rule interact with each other, rather than make their own independent decisions;
moreover, their behaviors might be correlated across periods.9
We ﬁrst focus on the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments. The top panel of the table
reports statistics concerning all subjects. The ﬁrst row of the panel indicates that the actual
frequency of being an H-type in the two treatments is very close to the pre-speciﬁed levels.
The second row displays the percentage of “low-income” reports out of all reports received
(i.e., the total number of reports from L-type players or lying H-type players, divided by 8).
The ratio is around 80% in the two treatments.
The middle and the bottom panels of the table provide data for testing our hypothesis
and examining the audit budget implications of the experiment results. Our ﬁndings are
summarized as follows:
Result 1 Hypothesis 1 is supported. The diﬀerence between the underreporting rates ob-
served in the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Support: The average underreporting rate is 60.83% in the Flat-rate treatment and 57.11%
in the Bounded treatment. A two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the underreporting rates of the two treatments are the same (p = 0.386). In
9To see whether our conclusion on Hypothesis 1 is robust, we also have done a two-sample z-test, with
64 observations (at the subject level) for the Flat-rate treatment and 4 observations (at the session level)
for the Bounded treatments. The hypothesis is still supported. In addition, we have done the test with 64
observations (at the subject level) for each of the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments. Even with this liberal
interpretation of the independence of the observations from the Bounded treatment, the test result continues
to support the hypothesis. Finally, we have run a logistic regression using subject-period observations. The
dependent variable equals 1 if an H-type subject underreports in a period and 0 if s/he honestly reports
in the period. The independent variable is whether the observation comes from the Bounded or Flat-rate
treatment (with or without social demographic controls). Based on a standard error corrected for clustering
by subject, the estimated coeﬃcient of the treatment variable is statistically insigniﬁcant at the 5% level.
This further conﬁrms that the underreporting rates in the two treatments are statistically indistinguishable.
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the last 10 periods, the magnitude of the diﬀerence in underreporting rate becomes slightly
larger but still statistically insigniﬁcant (p = 0.564).
Result 2 The bounded rule is more cost-eﬀective in the sense that on average
(i) fewer audits are performed, and
(ii) the budget-usage ratio is higher
in the Bounded treatment than in the Flat-rate treatment.
Support: The diﬀerence in the cheater detection rate, namely the frequency that a tax
cheater is caught during an audit stage, is not statistically signiﬁcant in both treatments
(p = 0.113 for all 30 periods; p = 0.149 for the last 10 periods). This means that the
bounded and ﬂat-rate rules are equally eﬀectively in detecting cheaters.
Several pieces of evidence support that the bounded rule is more cost-eﬀective. Assuming
a constant cost per audit, we can use the number of audits performed in a treatment as
a proxy for the audit resources consumed to achieve the compliance level observed. Both
the total and the average number of audits performed are signiﬁcantly lower in the Bounded
treatment (p < 0.05).
We also look at the audit selection rate, which is deﬁned as the proportion of “low-
income” reports selected for audit, out of the total number of such reports received. This
rate is signiﬁcantly lower in the Bounded treatment, both for all 30 periods or only the last
10 periods (p < 0.05). These results suggest that auditing with the bounded rule can achieve
the same compliance level at a lower cost.
Finally, we look at the budget usage ratio, which is deﬁned as the percentage of audit
resources actually used, out of the budget commitment required to credibly support an
audit rule. The ratio is 100% in the Bounded treatment, which means that all resources
committed are used at the full capacity in each period (i.e., two audits). Under the ﬂat-rate
rule, the budget-usage ratio is only 32%. The ineﬃciency is due to the fact that in order to
credibly implement the ﬂat-rate rule, the auditor must have the resources to be ready to do
all eight audits in each period. However, much fewer audits are actually carried out.
In an equilibrium setting, Yim (2009) has analytically shown that even when the ﬂat-
rate rule can be implemented using large-sample random sampling, the budget usage ratio
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remains substantially below that of the bounded rule. Unfortunately, we cannot assess
this theoretical insight with our experiment because the size of the experimental taxpayer
population is only eight subjects.
The following is our result from the Bounded-hi-q treatment.
Result 3 The underreporting rate is signiﬁcantly lower in the Bounded-hi-q treatment than
in the Bounded and Flat-rate treatments. The higher compliance level is achieved with sig-
niﬁcantly fewer audits performed and with a higher budget-usage ratio.
Support: The average underreporting rate in the Bounded-hi-q treatment is 33.95% over
all 30 periods and 26.16% in the last 10 periods. The compliance level in this treatment
is the highest, as the underreporting rate is signiﬁcantly lower compared to the other two
treatments (p < 0.05). The diﬀerence is already salient in the ﬁrst period and remains highly
signiﬁcant throughout the other periods of the game.
Regarding auditing statistics, the total number of audits performed is smaller in this
treatment than in the Bounded treatment (p < 0.05). However, the audit selection rate
turns out to be signiﬁcantly higher ( p < 0.05), owing to fewer “low-income” reports received
given the higher q in this treatment. The cheater detection rate is remarkably higher as well
(p < 0.05). The budget-usage ratio is 95.63%, which is signiﬁcantly higher than that in the
Flat-rate treatment (32.03%).
4 Additional Analyses
While the main results discussed above have answered our research question concerning the
impact of disclosing audit policy details, the observed compliance levels remain unexplained
by the standard theory. In this section, we make an attempt to better understand individual-
level compliance behavior. The purpose is to ensure that we have not overlooked anything
that might lead to misinterpretation of the main results.
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4.1 Stochastic Nature of Individual-level Behavior
Figure 2 displays the frequency distributions of the individual underreporting rate across
treatments. The horizontal axis represents a subject’s individual underreporting rate, i.e.,
the percentage of times where the subject when assigned as a high-income taxpayer submits
a “low-income” report. The vertical axis represents the percentage of subjects with similar
underreporting rates in a treatment.
The main message conveyed by Figure 2 is that the standard theory has limited ex-
planatory power over the individual-level data of the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments.
Only 29.13% of the subjects in the Flat-rate treatment and 23.43% of those in the Bounded
treatment underreport whenever receiving a high income, behaving in accordance with the
standard theory. The percentage of seemingly intrinsically honest subjects, who always re-
port their income truthfully, is 12.5% in the Flat-rate treatment and 15.63% in Bounded.
Even after correcting for the presence of seemingly intrinsically honest players, the standard
theory still underpredicts the compliance levels observed in the treatments.
Figure 2 also indicates that around 60 percent of the subjects switch between the two
options at various levels of frequency. This pattern is very similar in the two treatments
(Mann-Whitney test: p = 0.322). In contrast, the distribution of the underreporting rate
in Bounded-hi-q is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0.05). Throughout this
treatment, only about 7% of the H-type choose to submit “low-income” reports, whereas
33% of them honestly report a “high income.”
Recognizing the highly stochastic nature of individual-level behavior, we conduct addi-
tional analyses to better understand the behavior using several choice models under un-
certainty. Because the game in Bounded-hi-q has multiple equilibria and the compliance
behavior observed in the treatment appears to follow a diﬀerent pattern, we focus on the
Flat-rate and Bounded treatments in our attempt to explain the stochastic component of
the behavior.
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4.2 Choice Models under Uncertainty
The standard theory predicts that strategic players will always choose to submit “low-
income” reports. On the other hand, intrinsically honest players will always report the type
of income they receive. In either case, the choices should be consistent across periods. In con-
trast, Figure 2 suggests that many participants in our experiment make stochastic choices,
which is consistent with McFadden’s discrete-choice framework (McFadden (2001)).
This framework relaxes the perfect rationality assumption to accommodate boundedly
rational behavior. Models in this framework are motivated by empirical studies where ob-
served decisions exhibit some noise (see, e.g., Fischbacher and Stefani (2007), Loomes (2005),
Rieskamp (2008), and Wilcox (2011)). Such noise could come from observed sources like de-
cision errors. It could also arise from unobserved or unmodeled channels such as individual
perceptions of the game or sensitivity to payoﬀ changes. The presence of such noise leads to
people making decision errors and hence behaving inconsistently with their choices.
The Flat-rate treatment is essentially a non-strategic choice-under-uncertainty problem for
H-type players. Therefore, the classic individual discrete-choice model is a natural choice to
explain the stochastic individual behavior. The Bounded treatment introduces interactions
among subjects. A general way to incorporate decision errors into a strategic interaction
setting is the quantal response equilibrium ﬁrst proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
This equilibrium concept is based on McFadden (1973)’s random utility maximization model
of the same framework.
Using the discrete-choice framework, we estimate and compare three choice models under
uncertainty. They are risk aversion, loss aversion, and loss aversion with probability weight-
ing. Brief descriptions of the models follow. (See the appendix for further details of the loss
aversion model and of the discrete-choice framework applied to our experimental setting.)
Risk aversion. The ﬁrst model we consider simply relaxes the assumption of risk neu-
trality. In the risk aversion model, subjects are assumed to have a constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility function: u(π) = (π1−r) / (1− r), where π is the disposable income
(i.e., after-tax income) and r is the CRRA coeﬃcient. This model oﬀers the possibility of
explicitly testing the assumption of risk neutrality. If the estimated r is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
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from zero, then the null hypothesis that subjects are risk neutral can be rejected. We have
also considered alternative utility forms such as constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and
power-expo. There is little change in the goodness of ﬁt to the data.
Loss aversion. While the observed compliance behavior can be explained by risk attitude,
it is also consistent with the notion of loss aversion. Recent research has shown that loss
aversion provides a much better account of tax evasion both in the lab and in the ﬁeld (see,
e.g., Elﬀers and Hessing (1997), Yaniv (1999), King and Sheﬀrin (2002), and Dhami and Al
Nowaihi (2007, 2010)). The loss aversion model characterizes individuals as loss-averse in
terms of the disposable income relative to some reference income. For a given amount of such
relative income x > 0 and a value function v(x), losses are weighted more than gains, i.e.,
| − v(−x)| > v(x). We consider Tversky and Kahneman (1992)’s speciﬁcation of the value
function: v(x) = xα if x ≥ 0, and v(x) = −λ(−x)β if x < 0. The α and β are the parameters
determining the curvature of the function, and λ is the coeﬃcient of loss aversion. Subjects
are considered loss-averse if λ > 1.10
Loss aversion with probability weighting. Besides the value function, subjects could also
have a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale. For example, Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979) ﬁnd that people overestimate low probabilities and underestimate high probabil-
ities. To examine the eﬀect of subjective probability weighting, we also estimate a model of
loss aversion with probability weighting. In particular, we consider a popular form of the
one-parameter probability-weighting function: w(γ) = γδ/(γδ+(1− γ)δ), where γ is a prob-
ability and δ ≥ 0 is the weighting parameter. Note that if δ < 1, the weighting function has
an inverted-S shape, which is concave for low probabilities and convex for high probabilities,
and crosses the diagonal at the probability of 1/3.
Eﬀectively speaking, H-type players’ reporting decision is like choosing between a safe
option (honest reporting) and a risky lottery (underreporting), with known, constant prob-
abilities in the Flat-rate treatment but unknown, endogenous probabilities in the Bounded
treatment. Thus, the reporting choice in the Bounded treatment is aﬀected by the subjects’
10Given a ﬁxed payoﬀ structure, data from the tax compliance game alone contain only two moments
(i.e., the percentages of subjects selecting the “risky” lottery in the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments).
They lack suﬃcient identiﬁcation power to estimate three parameters jointly. Therefore, we pool together
the data from the risk elicitation task and the tax compliance game to jointly estimate the parameters.
16
perceived average audit probability, denoted by â. Our analyses let us infer an estimate of â.
With the estimate, we can answer the following questions: What average audit probability of
a ﬂat-rate rule would induce the same level of compliance as observed in the Bounded treat-
ment? Moreover, how do risk aversion, loss aversion, and probability weighting inﬂuence the
subjects’ perception of the average audit probability in the Bounded treatment?
4.3 Additional Result
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the three models based on the Flat-rate and Bounded
treatments. All coeﬃcient estimates of the models are highly signiﬁcant (at the 1% level),
suggesting that all of them are useful in explaining the compliance levels observed in the
treatments. For instance, the risk aversion speciﬁcation suggests that subjects are risk averse
in both treatments, as the CRRA coeﬃcient r is signiﬁcantly larger than zero. It indicates
that risk aversion helps in explaining the data. The perceived audit probability in the
Bounded treatment is 0.336. In other words, a ﬂat-rate rule with an audit probability of
0.336, rather than 0.4, would induce such risk-averse subjects to comply at a level similar to
what has been observed in the Bounded treatment.
Results of the loss aversion speciﬁcation suggest that subjects are loss-averse. The esti-
mated coeﬃcient of loss aversion λ is larger than 1 in both treatments, which means that
subjects are more sensitive to a loss than a gain of the same magnitude. The estimated slope
coeﬃcients of the value function indicate concavity in the gain domain (α) and convexity in
the loss domain (β). Moreover, a Vuong test on non-nested models favors the loss aversion
model over the risk aversion model (p < 0.05). For loss-averse subjects, a ﬂat-rate rule with
an audit probability of 0.306 would induce the same compliance level as observed in the
Bounded treatment.
The third speciﬁcation combines loss aversion with probability weighting. We ﬁnd that
this speciﬁcation does not improve the goodness of ﬁt signiﬁcantly. Moreover, the probability-
weighting parameter δ is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1 for both treatments (p = 0.438 and
0.397 for Flat-rate and Bounded, respectively). So the subjectively weighted probabilities
used by the subjects on average are in line with the objective probabilities. Overall, the
results suggest that what drives the observed compliance level is likely to be the way the
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subjects view losses and gains, rather than how they assess probabilities.
Figure 3 displays the predicted underreporting rates based on diﬀerent models and the
actual rates observed in the treatments. Because probability weighting adds little to the
loss aversion model, the predicted underreporting rate of this model is based on coeﬃcients
estimated without probability weighting. The compliance behaviors in our experiment are
best explained by the loss aversion model, compared to the alternatives, namely the risk
aversion model and the standard theory with perfectly rational, risk-neutral players (with
and without correction for seemingly intrinsically honest subjects). We conclude this section
with the following result.
Result 4 The compliance levels observed in the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments can be
satisfactorily explained by a loss aversion model under the discrete-choice framework.
The additional analyses in this section solve the otherwise unexplained levels of compliance
observed in the experiment. Throughout the process, we do not ﬁnd anything that might
compromise the conclusion from our main analysis.
5 Relation to Tax Compliance Literature
IRS has the practice of disclosing only broad statistics such as the audit rate of each income
class. In line with this, many tax compliance studies consider settings where taxpayers are
told to be audited independently at a known, constant probability (see literature reviews by
Andreoni et al. (1998), Alm and McKee (1998), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002)). Such a
setting is captured by the Flat-rate treatment in our experiment.
In the vast majority of tax compliance studies, the attention is on the interaction between
the auditor and a taxpayer, without considering the interaction with the whole taxpayer
population, or the interactions among taxpayers. A notable exception is Alm and McKee
(2004), who experimentally study a “DIF” rule that represents IRS’s audit policy based on
discriminant function (DIF) scores. The audit probability of their “DIF” rule depends on
the deviation of an individual’s reported income from the average of the incomes reported
by all other players. This audit rule induces a coordination problem for taxpayers who want
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to cheat on taxes. In their experiment, all participants receive the same level of income in
any given period. This is not the case in our experiment. Besides this distinction leading
to a diﬀerent coordination problem in the Bounded treatment, another diﬀerence is that
the interaction induced by the bounded rule among taxpayers does not always lead to a
coordination game.
Tax compliance studies rarely explicitly consider audit budget. Unlike others, Yim (2009)
emphasizes the importance of the budget commitment required to support an audit policy
and the implication to the structure of the policy. Using a setting similar to the classic
tax compliance game (Graetz et al. (1986)), he shows that the equilibrium audit policy
that minimizes the required committed budget takes the form of the bounded rule. Such a
binary-income setting, or similar discrete-type extensions, have been used in many studies
(e.g., Mills et al. (2010), Mills and Sansing (2000), and some others cited in footnote 4 of
Yim (2009)).
Though stylized, the binary-income setting captures some salient features of audit se-
lection in reality. For example, low-income taxpayers in the setting have no incentive to
submit “high-income” reports. So these reports must have been submitted by high-income
taxpayers. Because auditing such reports cannot lead to higher tax revenue, these reports
are not audited under either of the audit rules considered in our experiment. Indeed, the
IRM prescribes that “[c]lassiﬁers [who review computer-prescreened tax returns to determine
which are to be put forth for examination (i.e., audit)] should compare the potential beneﬁts
to be derived from examining a return to the resources required to perform the examination.
Although you may identify some potentially good issues on the return, if they would not
yield a signiﬁcant adjustment, the return should be accepted as ﬁled.” (emphasis added) (see
paragraph 1 of IRM 4.1.5.1.5.1.1 (10-24-2006) in Section 5 “Classiﬁcation and Case Build-
ing” of the manual). In line with this, a recent study by Phillips (2010) shows that IRS
focuses on auditing taxpayers expected to have high unmatched income (i.e., income cannot
be cross-checked with third-party reports such as Form W-2) and rarely examines taxpayers
likely to have only matched income.
Besides Yim (2009), Erard and Feinstein (1994) also explicitly consider audit budget.
However, like other tax compliance studies, they focus on the interaction between the auditor
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and an atomic taxpayer in the population. This eﬀectively reduces the whole taxpayer
population into a representative taxpayer. The complexity of the model gives rise to the
characterization of the equilibrium by a second-order diﬀerential equation The equation
does not have a closed-form solution and hence can only be solved numerically. In contrast,
the setting of the classic tax compliance game is much simpler. Moreover, the bounded
rule that constitutes an equilibrium audit strategy has a simple structure determined by the
audit capacity constraint.
Indeed, audit capacity is an important concern in IRS’s operations. Guidelines in the
IRM suggest that a substantial part of the agency’s operations is done at the District Oﬃce
level, referred to as “[geographical] Area” in the manual. The audit capacity of each District
Oﬃce, namely the staﬀ force constituting mainly of revenue agents, tax compliance oﬃcers,
return classiﬁers, etc (referred to as “posts-of-duty (POD)” in the manual), is determined
based on the approved national examination plan constrained by resources requested in the
Congressional Budget (see IRM 4.1.1.2 (10-24-2006) “Examination Plan”).
Besides audit capacity, the bounded rule or the binary-income setting has other stylized
features resembling IRS’s audit policy. To point out the similarity, it is useful to begin
with a quick overview of the audit selection procedure in reality. According to the IRM,
tax returns are ﬁrst computer-scored using the DIF System (see IRM 4.1.3.2 (10-24-2006)
“DIF Overview”). Then with the national minimum cutoﬀ score determined by National
Headquarters each year, returns above the cutoﬀ are added to the DIF inventory (see IRM
4.1.1.3 (10-24-2006) “Minimum DIF Cutoﬀ Score”).
Alm and McKee (2004) have studied a “DIF” rule that triggers an audit to a taxpayer
based on the “deviation between his or her reported income and the average reported income”
in an experiment session. Anecdotal evidence, however, indicates that what matters most
is not the reported income of a return relative to others’ average. “[T]ax professionals, who
are familiar with I.R.S. procedures, say that the [DIF] formula examines the relationships
between those income and deduction items that the I.R.S. has found to be the best indicators
of compliance, chiseling and cheating.” (Johnston (1996)). In line with this, a statistics
professor Aczel (1994) has used a “supercomputer and modern statistical techniques like
logistic regression or classiﬁcation and regression trees to determine which kinds of returns
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get audited” (Johnston (1996)) and found that “taxpayers whose Schedule A deductions are
less than 35 percent of income are almost never audited, while those who deduct 44 percent
or more of income are almost certain to be audited. Those who fall in between those ﬁgures
are at risk of being audited, depending on which type of deductions they take.” (Johnston
(1995a)).
Thus, whether certain deduction items have been claimed and their amounts relative to
the reported income of the return seems to be most important. A return would have little
chance to be added to the DIF inventory if “suspicious” deduction items were not claimed.
The red-ﬂag nature of claiming “suspicious” deduction items is similar to the pooling of
“low-income” reports by lying taxpayers with those by honest low-income taxpayers in the
binary-income setting of the experiment.
Not every return added to the central DIF inventory will eventually be audited. To
be selected for audit, a return must ﬁrst be among those ordered by a relevant Area for
classiﬁcation into accepted as ﬁled or selected for examination (i.e., audit) (see IRM 4.1.5.1.3
(10-24-2006) “Sorting of Classiﬁed Returns”). Areas might have diﬀerent selection rates for
a variety of reasons (e.g., local issues, classiﬁers’ judgment, etc). Therefore, to meet the audit
target of an Area in the Examination Plan, “[t]he PSP [(i.e., Planning and Special Programs
Territory Manager)] will calculate the Area DIF cutoﬀ score ... giving consideration to the
selection rate.” (see IRM 4.1.1.3.1 (10-24-2006) “DIF Cutoﬀ Score”). With the Area DIF
cutoﬀ, returns of an Area are divided into two groups: above-cutoﬀ returns (analogous to the
“low-income” reports in the experiment) and below-cutoﬀ (analogous to the “high-income”
reports).
Areas order returns from the central DIF inventory based on their speciﬁc cutoﬀs. After
classiﬁcation, returns selected for audit are categorized into “Field Examination” (i.e., visits
at taxpayers’ sites) or “Oﬃce Examination” (i.e., interviews at IRS oﬃces) (see IRM 4.1.5.1.3
(10-24-2006) “Sorting of Classiﬁed Returns”). The returns are added to the Examination
inventory (see IRM 4.1.1.6.3 (10-24-2006) “Inventory Monitoring”). Later the audits of these
returns are assigned to POD’s (i.e., revenue agents, tax compliance oﬃcers, etc) “based on
ZIP codes [on the returns] using the ZIP/POD Lookup Table” (see IRM 4.1.1.7 (10-24-2006)
“ZIP/POD Tables”).
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The IRM has guidelines to regulate the ﬂow of orders in accordance with the Examina-
tion Plan. A POD Supplement Order is allowed as an exception if “there is a workload
shortage at a speciﬁc POD” (see IRM 4.1.3.4 (10-24-2006) “Guidelines for Ordering Re-
turns”). Nonetheless, the IRM speciﬁes that if such orders “result in the delivery of returns
that are below the [Area] DIF cutoﬀ score”, “not more than 10% of the returns ordered
for any POD should be below the DIF cutoﬀ score.” (see IRM 4.1.1.3.2 (10-24-2006) “Use
of DIF Cutoﬀ Score for Return Orders”). In other words, aside from the 10% ﬂexibility, a
POD is not permitted to audit below-cutoﬀ returns even when the POD has audited all the
above-cutoﬀ returns assigned to it, with idle capacity to audit more. This feature is similar
to the key characteristic of the bounded rule: audit as many as possible if the number of
suspicious reports exceeds the given capacity, or otherwise audit all such reports but none
of the unsuspicious despite under-utilized capacity.
Because of the simple setting, the similarity with key features of the reality, and the
theoretical equivalence to the ﬂat-rate rule’s deterrence eﬀect, we use the bounded rule to
represent the underlying audit policy of a tax authority that discloses merely the average
audit probability to taxpayers.
6 Concluding Remarks
Tax authorities around the world often are reluctant to disclose audit policy details.11 In
particular, the US IRS has the practice of releasing broad statistics like the audit rate of each
income class but opposes pressures demanding details on how diﬀerent circumstances might
result in a higher audit probability to taxpayers. In this paper, we ask whether the potential
adverse impact on tax compliance could be a serious concern justifying the reluctance of tax
authorities like IRS to disclose audit policy details.
To answer the question, we carefully consider the theoretical deterrence-equivalence of two
audit rules and the documentedWPPT puzzle in designing the treatments of our experiment.
In the Flat-rate treatment, participants are told that they independently face a known audit
11“[M]ost [tax] agencies undertake substantial precautions to maintain the secrecy of their audit selection
procedures.” (Andreoni et al. (1998)). See OECD (2004) for an overview of various countries’ audit selection
systems.
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probability. By contrast, participants in the Bounded treatment are fully informed of the
contingent audit probability structure. We ﬁrst show that according to the standard theory,
participants should have a suﬃciently strong incentive to lie about their income, regardless
of the treatments. Based on this theoretical prediction that is consistent with the WPPT
puzzle, we develop the hypothesis for testing.
Our ﬁndings show that consistent with the WPPT puzzle, the observed compliance lev-
els are substantially higher than the theoretically predicted levels. Most important, the
compliance levels of the two treatments that represent merely disclosing the average audit
probability versus fully disclosing the audit policy details are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. This
main result supports our hypothesis, suggesting that disclosing audit policy details do not
necessarily reduce tax compliance. The examination with a third treatment to assess the
sensitivity of our results to the existence of multiple equilibria suggests that disclosing audit
policy details can increase, rather than reduce tax compliance.
We check two things to ensure that behaviors observed in the experiment are consistent
with what we know from theories, and hence our main results are not compromised by
anything that we could not explain. First, we verify that the audit budget implications
of the observed behaviors are broadly consistent with the theoretical insights of the study
where the equivalence between the bounded and ﬂat-rate rules was derived. Then we use
alternative choice models under uncertainty to explain the observed compliance levels under-
predicted by the standard theory. Results from these exercises conﬁrm what we know from
theories. We therefore believe that our main result is not aﬀected by some unknown factor.
Obviously, the evidence collected from one experiment cannot constitute a strong ground
for tax authorities (sharing IRS’s concern) to change their disclosure practices. Nevertheless,
given the trend in increasingly stronger demand for government transparency, the evidence
from this experiment does provide a reasonable basis for tax authorities to be more open-
minded in viewing the issue. Compared to IRS, some agencies in other countries appear
to be more liberal and transparent (see, e.g., Canada Revenue Agency and Australian Tax
Oﬃce discussed in Hasseldine (2007) and Leviner (2008)). However, unless tax authorities let
researchers examine more accurately and thoroughly the impacts of disclosing audit policy
details, no one can tell what level of disclosure is best for society.
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Let us re-iterate our suggestion already made in the introduction: IRS can set out a
plan to disclose on a properly selected date of each year more information about the audit
policy. This way researchers can precisely analyze the impact of the incremental information
disclosure. Further evidence can thus be provided to determine whether even more disclosure
or IRS’s current position of information withholding should be supported.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of underreporting rate over 30 periods
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Figure 2: Frequency distributions of individual underreporting rate
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Figure 3: Model predictions of underreporting rate versus actual observations
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Table 1: Experimental treatments
Treatment High-income Audit probability a Number of
probability q or capacity K subjects
Flat-rate 0.5 a = 0.4 64
Bounded 0.5 K = 2 64
Bounded-hi-q 0.9 K = 2 64
36
Table 2: Summary statistics of treatments
All 30 Periods Last 10 Periods
Flat-rate Bounded Bounded-hi-q Flat-rate Bounded Bounded-hi-q
All subjects
High-income frequency 0.514
(0.007)
0.491
(0.039)
0.898
(0.024)
0.527
(0.042)
0.519
(0.038)
0.908
(0.013)
Percentage of
“low-income” reports
79.74%
(0.074)
78.85%
(0.015)
40.31%
(0.053)
77.97%
(0.066)
75.94%
(0.018)
32.97%
(0.055)
H-type subjects
Underreporting rate 60.83%
(0.144)
57.11%
(0.049)
33.95%
(0.038)
58.16%
(0.143)
53.32%
(0.052)
26.16%
(0.046)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p = 0.386 p = 0.564
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Auditing statistics
Cheater detection rate 38.76%
(0.065)
33.13%
(0.043)
73.27%
(0.025)
42.08%
(0.107)
31.88%
(0.125)
70.97%
(0.105)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p = 0.113 p = 0.149
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Total no. of audits 153.8
(18.14)
120
(0.000)
114.8
(4.500)
53.75
(8.098)
40
(0.000)
37
(2.160)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Avg. no. of audits
(per group per period)
2.56
(0.300)
2
(0.000)
1.91
(0.065)
2.69
(0.414)
2
(0.000)
1.85
(0.093)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Audit selection rate 40.16%
(0.030)
31.71%
(0.006)
59.99%
(0.062)
42.96%
(0.038)
32.94%
(0.007)
71.31%
(0.095)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Budget usage ratio 32.03%
(0.181)
100%
(0.000)
95.63%
(0.032)
32.09%
(0.181)
100%
(0.000)
92.54%
(0.033)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
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Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses. Statistical testing on the treatment eﬀects is based on the
two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test (also called the Mann-Whitney test), with each session constituting an
independent observation. High-income frequency is the actual frequency of the subjects being assigned as
a high-income taxpayer in a treatment. Percentage of “low-income” reports is the total number of “low-
income” reports received divided by 8, regardless of whether the reports are submitted by genuine low-income
taxpayers or lying high-income taxpayers. Underreporting rate is the percentage of times where subjects when
assigned as a high-income taxpayer submit a “low-income” report. Cheater detection rate is the frequency
that a tax cheater is caught during an audit stage. Audit selection rate is the proportion of “low-income”
reports selected for audit, out of the total number of such reports received. Budget usage ratio is the
percentage of audit resources actually used, out of the budget commitment required to credibly support an
audit rule.
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Table 3: Estimation of choice models under uncertainty
Risk aversion Loss aversion
Loss aversion with
Prob. Weighting
Flat-rate Bounded Flat-rate Bounded Flat-rate Bounded
CRRA coeﬃcient r
0.366
(0.350)
0.594
(0.055)
Gain domain curvature α
0.445
(0.034)
0.428
(0.038)
0.640
(0.459)
0.533
(0.075)
Loss domain curvature β
0.548
(0.052)
0.708
(0.030)
0.586
(0.068)
0.858
(0.073)
Loss aversion coeﬃcient λ
1.100
(0.802)
1.148
(0.030)
1.674
(0.123)
1.283
(0.171)
Weighting parameter δ
1.150
(0.193)
0.899
(0.120)
Perceived audit prob. â
0.336
(0.017)
0.305
(0.007)
0.240
(0.023)
Log-likelihood -1163.773 -1087.292 -1141.710 -1082.473 -1141.353 -1082.111
Observations 2331 2287 2331 2287 2331 2287
Note: All coeﬃcient estimates in this table are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. To account for
within-group correlation, the standard errors are clustered by individual. The risk aversion speciﬁcation is
based on a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function: u(π) = (π1−r)/(1− r), where π is
the disposable income (i.e., after-tax income) and r is the CRRA coeﬃcient. The loss aversion
speciﬁcation is based on Tversky and Kahneman (1992)’s speciﬁcation of the value function: v(x) = xα if
x ≥ 0, and v(x) = −λ(−x)β if x < 0, where α and β are the parameters determining the curvature of
the function in the gain and loss domains, respectively, and λ is the coeﬃcient of loss aversion. The loss
aversion with probability weighting speciﬁcation is based on a popular one-parameter probability-weighting
function: w(γ) = γδ/(γδ+(1− γ)δ), where γ is a probability and δ ≥ 0 is the weighting parameter.
The perceived audit probability â is the audit probability of a ﬂat-rate rule that would induce the same
level of compliance as observed in the Bounded treatment.
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